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In the past two decades the UN has gone through several attempts at addressing the elusive aim of 
achieving global peace. With Africa 
playing host to almost half of the 
UN’s peacekeeping missions it is 
small wonder that the challenge of 
attaining durable peace continues to 
seize the minds of Africa’s leaders. This 
article looks at the outlines of a new 
approach which is emerging within the 
UN and how Africa’s strategies will be 
articulating with that.
When António Guterres, the new 
Secretary General of the United 
Nations, will have his first meeting with 
the newly elected Chair of the African 
Union Commission in 2017 there is no 
doubt that addressing the challenges 
to peace in Africa will top the agenda. 
With conflict on the continent costing 
an average of $18bn per annum, 
achieving peace has to be Africa’s as 
well as the world body’s top priority. 
Since its first peacekeeping mission 
in 1948 after the creation of Israel, the 
UN has had 71 missions around the 
world. Currently it has 16, involving 
about 100 000 personnel. Nine of 
these peacekeeping missions are in 
Africa with the largest UN mission in 
the DRC, involving about 19 000 blue 
helmets. UN missions in Africa have 
often made the difference between 
descent into civil war and a slow march 
to some form of stability. Liberia and 
Sierra Leone could be considered as 
such successes. However, some, like 
MONUSCO in the DRC, seem to be 
endless, while those in places like the 
Central African Republic have taken 
their toll on South African troops 
deployed there.
Nelson Mandela in his various 
pronouncements, and especially in the 
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oft quoted 1993 Foreign Affairs article, 
cited the following as key pillars upon 
which international relations should be 
based:
• That issues of human rights are 
central to international relations 
and an understanding that they 
extend beyond the political, 
embracing the economic, social and 
environmental.
• That peace is the goal for which all 
nations should strive, and where 
this breaks down, internationally 
agreed and nonviolent mechanisms, 
including arms control regimes, 
must be employed.
This profoundly multi-dimensional 
approach is to be found in the new 
framework which is emerging, which 
has seen the adoption of what are 
called developmental and even robust 
peacemaking approaches.
UN Evolution
The UN has been continuously 
evaluating its approach to peace 
missions. Some of the major milestones 
of this introspection have been the 
Brahimi Report of 2000, the 2010 
‘New Partnership Agenda’ and the 
2015/2016 High-Level Independent 
Panel review. 
In 2000 the UN carried out a 
deep and influential review of its 
peacekeeping operations under the 
chairmanship of Lakhdar Brahimi, a 
former Foreign Minister of Algeria. The 
Brahimi Report emphasised that the 
approach of the UN should be guided 
by:
• Preventing conflict from even 
breaking out though an integrated 
approach involving all arms of the 
UN, Bretton Wood institutions, 
governments, and NGOs.
• The UN developing the capacity 
for peace-building strategies. This 
recommendation addressed the 
complex issues of use of civilian 
processes in strengthening the 
law and observation of human 
rights, as well as the processes of 
demobilisation and reintegration of 
conflicting forces.
• It emphasised that there must 
be clear mandates for each 
peacekeeping mission. Too often 
such missions were embarked 
upon without clear, credible and 
achievable objectives. The report 
also laid out rapid timeframes 
for deployment of peacekeeping 
operations.
The report went into a number of 
other doctrinal, strategic and tactical 
issues. However, as shall be seen by 
subsequent debates there still seems 
to be many differences as to how 
these laudable objectives can be 
approached. 
To date the Brahimi Report remains 
the starting point of most of the current 
UN’s approach to peacekeeping. 
A decade after the issuing of the 
report, and as UN peace deployment 
was reaching a new height, the UN 
brought its practices on the basis of 
the recommendations made up to 
date with a new document, ‘A New 
Partnership Agenda: Charting a New 
Horizon for UN Peacekeeping’. 
Written in the aftermath of the 
Rwanda genocide, it noted that 
the sheer scale and complexity 
of peacekeeping was straining its 
personnel, administrative and support 
machinery. New political, military and 
financial challenges were threatening 
to erode the unity of vision and 
purpose of the global peacekeeping 
partnership. ‘A renewed partnership 
and a shared agenda are essential to 
ensuring that UN peacekeeping can 
meet the challenges of today and 
tomorrow’, the document said. This 
document re-emphasised the need 
for such partnerships to work within 
a commonly understood strategy, 
cohesive mission planning and 
management, clear political direction, 
clarity of roles and what is expected of 
the role-players, faster deployment and 
crisis management; and it set out what 
had become a particular problem: a 
new field support strategy. 
The report went into some detail 
on peacebuilding as part of a conflict 
preventive strategy. This meant 
focusing on the capacity of the affected 
governments to extend their capacity 
to improve the maintenance of peace.
The UN then embarked in 2015 
with three reviews to look at how 
sustainable peace can be achieved. 
These were:
• The establishment by the UN 
Secretary General of a High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace 
Operations to review the state of 
peace operations and future needs. 
• The launch of a Global Study to 
examine progress and challenges 
since the UN adopted on 31 
October 2000 the Security Council 
Resolution 1325 on Women, 
Peace and Security. The resolution 
reaffirmed the important role of 
women in the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts and urged 
the development of gendered 
perspectives on all aspects of peace 
missions.
• The establishment by the UN 
General Assembly and UN Security 
Council of an Advisory Group 
of Experts to review the UN 
Peacebuilding Architecture.
There were four shifts identified 
by the High-Level Independent 
Panel – namely the centrality of 
having a clear political approach, 
the utilisation of the full spectrum 
of peacekeeping operations, the 
strengthening of partnerships and the 
necessity of the United Nations to be 
“field-focused”. When the General 
Assembly’s Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations met in 
February 2016 the delegates noted 
that the UN’s peace operations had to 
take into consideration newly emerging 
challenges such as asymmetric warfare, 
cyber threats and pandemics. This 
could be seen in the escalation of 
violence in Syria with the spread of 
violent extremism, the proliferation of 
weapons and epidemics such as Ebola.
Chapter VII  
allows the Council 
to "determine the 
existence of any threat 
to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act 
of aggression" and 
to take military and 
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The UN’s peace efforts are 
centred around the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and 
the Department of Field Support. Hervé 
Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations, pointed out 
at the meeting that the other issues 
which need to be considered were 
the safety and security of blue helmet 
personnel, strengthening operational 
support capacities, the protection of 
civilians and conduct and discipline. 
The latter was due to the increasing 
incidence of sexual abuse of innocent 
civilians by certain errant blue 
helmets. Delegates to the meeting, 
when addressing allegations of sexual 
exploitation and abuse stressed the 
need for a zero-tolerance policy as 
the work of peacekeeping missions 
evolved.
Atul Khar, Under-Secretary-General 
for Field Support, said the international 
community should redouble efforts 
to support peacekeeping operations, 
particularly the missions in the most 
dangerous theatres of operation. 
Attacks such as the one seen in Mali 
demonstrated that more needed to be 
done to protect peacekeepers, he said, 
calling on relevant Member States to 
bring those responsible for such attacks 
to justice.
The dryness of official UN 
documents is matched only by the 
arcane speeches given by the various 
delegates in the debates. One needs 
to be a haruspex, which refers to 
the practice in ancient Rome by a 
religious official to interpret signs by 
inspecting the insides of sacrificial 
animals.  For example, the question of 
terrorism was addressed squarely in the 
February 2016 debate. The delegate 
of India shared the views of the High-
Level Panel against the deployment 
of peacekeeping operations in 
counterterrorism arenas. A number of 
other speakers echoed that sentiment, 
stressing that efforts to combat terrorism 
should be kept separate from the work 
of peacekeeping missions.
However, the delegate of Egypt, 
while aligning himself with the position 
of the Non-Aligned Movement, pointed 
out that the rise of non-State actors that 
perpetrated violence and challenged 
State authority had become one of 
the emerging threats to international 
peace and security. While Egypt did 
not believe peacekeepers should be 
deployed to counter terrorism, he 
was convinced that a more coherent 
approach to peacekeeping that 
focused on empowering the State 
would be most valuable for long-term 
and sustainable peace.  
There has been generally continued 
emphasis on the political sphere, 
which had been raised inter alia by the 
Brahimi report. At the February 2016 
meeting the UN’s Deputy Secretary-
General, Jan Eliasson, said the UN’s 
peacekeeping structures were a tool 
to advance political, not military, 
solutions to conflict, and to help States 
and local communities resolve their 
differences.  The delegate of Norway 
said the best deterrence and response 
to an escalation of violence was 
proactive political engagement and 
prevention. 
In continued debates on the Panel’s 
report in the Special Political and 
Decolonization Committee on 21 
October 2016, delegates noted that 
attempts had recently been made 
to expand or alter peacekeeping 
mandates without consulting host 
States and sometimes without their 
consent. Egypt’s representative said 
the fact that peacekeeping mandates 
created under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter required no 
consent had been used as the pretext 
for such actions. 
Chapter VII allows the Council to 
"determine the existence of any threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression" and to take military 
and nonmilitary action to "restore 
international peace and security". 
Chapter VII also gives the Military Staff 
Committee responsibility for strategic 
coordination of forces placed at the 
disposal of the UN Security Council. 
It is made up of the chiefs of staff of 
the five permanent members of the 
Council.
At the October 2016 meeting 
delegates felt that such an approach 
threatened to tarnish the credibility 
of the United Nations and to place 
troops as well as civilian personnel 
at risk, emphasising that any use of 
force must be absolutely necessary 
and duly mandated. The Egyptian 
delegate said that the role of regional 
organisations should be enhanced, 
including by providing support for the 
African Union’s deployment of capable 
peacekeeping missions, specifically 
through the provision of flexible and 
predictable financial resources.
South Africa’s representative said 
the African Union’s stance was that 
the core principles of peace operations 
– consent of the parties, impartiality 
and limited use of force – remained 
relevant. However, they must be 
interpreted in a flexible manner in 
light of new challenges, emphasising 
that African Union peace operations 
authorised by the Security Council 
must be adequately funded and 
resourced with the necessary logistics, 
enablers and equipment.
It was also pointed out that 
peacekeeping operations were being 
deployed in “situations in which there 
is no peace to keep”. The joint report 
of the African Union and the United 
Nations on benchmarks for deploying 
a peacekeeping mission in Somalia had 
established an important precedent 
because the situation on the ground 
in that country had not yet been 
prepared.
Capturing a key concern of the 
non-P5 members of the United Nations, 
the Vietnamese delegate said the new 
global context required peacekeeping 
operations to uphold the principles of 
sovereignty, territorial integrity of States, 
consent of the parties, impartiality 
and non-use of force except in self-
defence. She commended the effective 
implementation of peacekeeping 
mandates and the greater focus on 
mediation and preventive diplomacy, 
but felt that such efforts must be 
accompanied by activities promoting 
economic recovery, reintegration and 
capacity-building. In that regard, she 
called for strengthened coordination 
between the Security Council and 
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the Peacebuilding Commission in 
deliberations on long-term policies for 
sustaining peace. 
Africa’s position
Given the debates and developments 
in doctrine within the United Nation, 
what has been the African continent’s 
response? With 40% of the UN’s 
peacekeeping operations centred in 
Africa, and with increasing demands 
on the UN’s capacity, it was inevitable 
that regional bodies such as the African 
Union were expected to play a bigger 
and bigger role. We will not go into 
why there have been so many armed 
conflicts in Africa, except to mention 
that these increased in the wake of 
the end of the Cold War. This led to a 
massive influx of all kinds of weapons to 
fuel the fighting over Africa’s resources 
which was breaking out. 
Debate has been ongoing about 
the need for an Africa-wide standby 
force, which works in conjunction 
with the regional-based formations 
such as the Economic Community 
of Central African States, the Eastern 
African Standby Force, the North 
African Regional Capability, the SADC 
Brigade and ECOWAS Standby Force. 
There have also been instances where 
the UN has been involved, such as the 
hybrid force in Darfur.
The African Panel of the Wise issued 
a timely and profound reflection on 
the experiences in Africa, especially in 
relation to how to deal with perpetrators 
of conflict. Under the theme ‘Peace, 
Justice, and Reconciliation’ it 
addressed the problems of impunity 
from prosecution and the observation 
of human rights. On the former it says 
that ‘while sometimes reconciliation 
trumps justice in deeply divided 
societies, stable peace ultimately 
hinges on finding a judicious balance 
between the two objectives’.  
Africa entered a new era with the 
creation of the African Union and its 
associated structures such as the Peace 
and Security Council (PSC) as one of 
the five pillars of the African Peace 
and Security Architecture (APSA). Until 
then African countries had been troop 
contributors to UN peacekeeping 
operations, but not taken a leading 
role as first-responders to crises. Mali 
(AFISMA) and the CAR (MISCA) were 
instances where an REC, in this case 
ECOWAS, with the AU responded 
as the international response was 
tardy. The hybrid missions in Darfur 
(UNAMID) and Somalia (AMISOM) 
show the improving capacity of African 
countries.
It is worth citing substantially from 
Agenda 2063 of the African Union, 
especially ‘Aspiration Four: A peaceful 
and secure Africa’ which states: 
32. Mechanisms for peaceful prevention 
and resolution of conflicts will be 
functional at all levels. As a first 
step, dialogue-centred conflict 
prevention and resolution will be 
actively promoted in such a way 
that by 2020 all guns will be silent. A 
culture of peace and tolerance shall 
be nurtured in Africa’s children and 
youth through peace education.
33. Africa will be a peaceful and secure 
continent, with harmony among 
communities starting at grassroots 
level. The management of our 
diversity will be a source of wealth, 
harmony and social and economic 
transformation rather than a source 
of conflict.
34. We aspire that by 2063, Africa shall 
have:
• An entrenched and flourishing 
culture of human rights, 
democracy, gender equality, 
inclusion and peace;
• Prosperity, security and safety for 
all citizens; and
• Mechanisms to promote and 
defend the continent’s collective 
security and interests.
35. We recognize that a prosperous, 
integrated and united Africa, based 
on good governance, democracy, 
social inclusion and respect for 
human rights, justice and the rule of 
law are the necessary pre-conditions 
for a peaceful and conflict free 
continent.
36. The continent will witness 
improved human security with 
sharp reductions in violent crimes. 
There shall be safe and peaceful 
spaces for individuals, families and 
communities.
37. Africa shall be free from armed 
conflict, terrorism, extremism, 
intolerance and gender-based 
violence, which are major threats 
to human security, peace and 
development. The continent will 
be drugs-free, with no human 
trafficking, where organized 
crime and other forms of criminal 
networks, such as the arms trade 
and piracy, are ended. Africa shall 
have ended the illicit trade in and 
proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons.
38. Africa shall promote human and 
moral values based on inclusion and 
the rejection of all forms of terrorism, 
religious extremism and other forms 
of intolerance, irrespective of their 
motivations.
39. By 2063, Africa will have the 
capacity to secure peace and protect 
its citizens and their interests, 
through common defence, foreign 
and security policies. 
Challenges faced
It has to be acknowledged that 
implementation of African aspirations 
is, more often than not, hindered by 
the continent’s inability to adequately 
resource its own ambitions without 
external help. Disparities in regional 
resourcefulness and the paucity of 
continent-wide funding have become 
major impediments to operationalising 
a purely African crisis-response 
mechanism.
The following regional forces 
have been established: North Africa 
Regional Standby brigade (NASBRIG), 
East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), 
Force Multinationale de l’Afrique 
Centrale (FOMAC), Southern Africa 
Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG), 
ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG). 
The African Standby Force (ASF), 
made up of military, police and 
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standby brigades, is tasked not only 
with carrying out its rapid deployment 
capability (RDC) functions but also 
to conduct, observe and monitor 
peacekeeping missions. The RDC 
is an integral part of the regional 
standby force brigades, which are to 
act as precursors to the deployment 
of larger missions. Resource limitations 
coupled with slow decision-making 
(due to the multinational nature of 
such operations) and the commitment 
of some countries to more than one 
mission complicates the RDC.
The 5th Tana High Level Forum on 
Security in Africa 2016, a gathering 
of high powered role players from 
different parts of Africa, noted that 
‘Paradoxically, the AU as the primary 
agency for peace and security on the 
continent has not made peace building 
a priority’. However, it did adopt a 
policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
and Development (PCRD) in 2006, 
which saw it play a role in war-torn 
and post-conflict countries including 
Central African Republic (CAR), Sierra 
Leone, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire and in 
South Sudan. 
Dr Alhaji Sarjoh Bah, Head of the 
AU’s PCRD Division, speaking on the 
occasion of the tenth anniversary of 
the adoption of the PCRD policy in 
May 2016, remarked that ‘the test of 
whether we can silence the guns by 
2020 and ensure that they remain silent 
forever, is to some degree contingent 
on the successful implementation 
of the AU PCRD Policy. The recent 
relapses of several post-conflict 
Member States is a stark reminder of 
the imperative for robust, coordinated 
and more crucially, comprehensive 
PCRD interventions by the AU, RECs 
and other relevant stakeholders’. It 
should be noted that the standing 
commission on PCRD envisaged as 
an AU inter-departmental platform 
involving Civil Society Organisations 
has not been established ten years after 
it was proposed.
Tana 2016 also took note of the 
lack of a common interest or agenda 
in relation to peace operations. ‘For 
instance, Member States serving on 
the AU Peace and Security Council 
(AU PSC) are increasingly utilising 
the Council to advance their own 
national interests, as witnessed by the 
decreasing levels of rotation of Council 
membership and increasing levels of 
disunity within the Council, making 
its proceedings resemble those of the 
UNSC’. It did throw a fundamental 
challenge to African leaders when 
it asked: are African actors willing 
to truly own and make the required 
investments to make this capability 
sustainable, and how should this 
available capability be used in future?
 On the positive side, whereas in 
2002 no personnel were deployed in 
AU-mandated peace operations, an 
average of 30,000–40,000 uniformed 
personnel were deployed in African 
peace operations between 2013–2015. 
This strong deployment demonstrates, 
to a large extent, that Africa has indeed 
developed a capability to undertake 
peace operations, despite the countless 
challenges and shortcomings that may 
have dogged these experiences. 
Also, on the positive side has been 
the experience of the creation of a 
hybrid UN/AU operation which was 
first attempted in Darfur, which led 
to the establishment of UNAMID. For 
another, transitions from AU operations 
to UN operations in Mali and the 
CAR have signaled a model of 
cooperation between intergovernmental 
organisations in relation to peace 
operations. 
The Force Intervention Brigade 
(FIB) which was deployed to the UN 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC) and became a game 
changer for the UN is a good example 
of where robust peacekeeping had to 
be resorted to. 
Further, African peace operations 
have been conducted outside of the 
traditional UN peacekeeping principles 
of impartiality, the non-use of force, 
and the consent of the parties to the 
conflict. Although these principles 
have increasingly also been called 
into question in relation to UN peace 
operations, they continue to provide 
an alternative framework through 
which to understand the conduct of 
peace operations.
Conclusion
In conclusion, under the new Chair 
of the AU Commission, and in a world 
which could see the rise of all forms of 
extremism – be it right wing Christian 
fundamentalists, be it Islamist militants, 
or Hindu chauvinism – Africa has to 
continue crafting a durable, sustainable 
and robust approach to achieving 
peace on the continent. The following 
features should make up the approach:
• An emphasis on the political and 
economic sources of conflict.
• A more clearly integrated 
relationship between the United 
Nations, the African Union and the 
Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs).
• Long term commitment by partners 
such as the EU to funding peace 
operations in Africa. 
While answering these complex 
issues we should keep in mind what 
Bruce A Dixon of Black Agenda Report 
asks:  ‘why are more men and guns the 
only aid African nations seem willing 
to offer one another? Why not doctors 
and medical schools, why not farming 
cooperatives, teachers and schools?”
The theme chosen for the 6th 
Tana High Level Forum on Security in 
Africa, set to take place in April 2017, 
‘Natural Resource Governance in 
Africa’ reflects the kind of challenges 
the continent is facing. Explaining the 
theme its organisers have stated: ‘the 
exploitation of the continent’s rich 
and diverse natural resources, both 
on land and sea, have created several 
paradoxes; in particular, those leading 
to inequality and poverty, corruption, 
unemployment, environmental 
degradation, violent conflicts, and the 
elusive quest to realise Africa’s full 
developmental potential. While natural 
resources can serve as a critical national 
asset to lift citizens out of dire economic 
situations into sustainable development 
as the experience of many countries 
have clearly demonstrated, the flipside 
is that “[Over] the last 60 years, in any 
particular year, between 40 and 60 per 
cent of ongoing internal armed conflicts 
have been linked to natural resources” 
(AfDB, 2016). Clearly, then, one of the 
most important and contentious issues 
Africa currently faces in the natural 
resource sector is how to reverse the 
misfortunes of exploitation and ‘bring 
governance back’ in ensuring that 
benefits accruing from the continent’s 
providential endowments create new 
opportunities and positive multiplier 
effects for citizens and the state’. ■
AFRICA
